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Coreferentialism refers to the common assumption in the literature that slurs (e.g. faggot) and descrip-
tors (e.g.male homosexual) are coreferential expressions with precisely the same extension. For instance,
Vallee (2014) recently writes that ‘‘If S is an ethnic slur in language L, then there is a non-derogatory
expression G in L such that G and S have the same extension’’ (p. 79). The non-derogatory expression G
is commonly considered the nonpejorative correlate (NPC) of the slur expression S (Hom, 2008) and it is
widely thought that every S has a coreferring G that possesses precisely the same extension. Yet here I
argue against this widespread assumption by first briefly introducing what slurs are and then consider-
ing four sources of supporting evidence showing that slurs and descriptors are in fact not coreferential
expressions with precisely the same extension. I argue that since slurs and descriptors differ in their ex-
tension they thereby differ in theirmeaning or content also. This article additionally introduces the notion
of a conceptual anchor in order to adequately account for the relationship between slurs and descriptors
actually evidenced in the empirical data, and further considers the inadequacy of common dictionary def-
initions of slurs. This article therefore contributes to the literature on slurs by demonstrating that previous
accounts operating on the assumption that slurs and descriptors are coreferential expressions with the
same extension, and that they thereby have the same meaning or content, are inconsistent with empir-
ical data and that an alternative account in accord with Croom (2011, 2013a, 2014b) better fits the facts
concerning their actual meaning and use.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).e1. Introduction
The humanities and social sciences have recently witnessed an
explosion of fascinating new research on slurs and derogatory lan-
guage (see for instance Cepollaro, 2015; Croom, 2015a,b; Jay and
Jay, 2015; Beaton and Washington, 2014; Blakemore, 2014; Cup-
kovic, 2014; Jackson, 2014; O’Dea et al., 2014; Saucier et al., 2014;
Weissbrod, 2014; Embrick and Henricks, 2013) and one widely
held assumption in the literature – call it coreferentialism – is that
slurs (e.g. faggot) and descriptors (e.g.male homosexual) are coref-
erential expressions with precisely the same extension (see for in-
stance Dummett, 1973, p. 454; Hornsby, 2001, p. 129; Williamson,
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Cready, 2010, p. 5, 9; Anderson and Lepore, 2013a, p. 26–27; An-
derson and Lepore, 2013b, p. 351; Vallee, 2014, p. 79). For instance,
Vallee (2014) recentlywrites in ‘‘Slurring and Common Knowledge
of Ordinary Language’’ that ‘‘If S is an ethnic slur in language L, then
there is a non-derogatory expression G in L such that G and S have
the same extension’’ (p. 79, my emphasis).1 The non-derogatory
expression G is commonly considered the nonpejorative correlate
(NPC) of the slur expression S (Hom, 2008) and it is widely thought
that every S has a coreferring G that possesses precisely the same
extension. Yet here I argue against this widespread assumption by
1 Quine (1951) explained in ‘‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’’ that ‘‘The class of all
entities of which a general term is true is called the extension of the term’’ (p. 21).
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sources of supporting evidence showing that slurs and descriptors
are in fact not coreferential expressions with precisely the same
extension. I argue that since slurs and descriptors differ in their ex-
tension they thereby differ in their meaning or content also. This
article additionally introduces the notion of a conceptual anchor
in order to adequately account for the relationship between slurs
and descriptors actually evidenced in the empirical data, and fur-
ther considers the inadequacy of common dictionary definitions of
slurs. This article therefore contributes to the literature on slurs by
demonstrating that previous accounts operating on the assump-
tion that slurs and descriptors are coreferential expressions with
the same extension, and that they thereby have the samemeaning
or content, are inconsistent with empirical data and that an alter-
native account in accord with Croom (2011, 2013a, 2014b) better
fits the facts concerning their actual meaning and use.2
2. Some basic features of slurs and their use
Slurs such as nigger, cracker, kike, chink, and slut are linguistic
expressions that are primarily used and understood to derogate
certain group members on the basis of their descriptive attributes
(such as their race or sex) and expressions of this kind have been
considered by many to pack some of the nastiest punches natural
language has to offer. In discussions concerning the history and use
of various race-directed and sex-directed slurs, Lemon (2013) ex-
plains that the slur nigger is a ‘‘dark, degrading hateful insult for
African Americans’’, Foreman (2013) explains that the slur cracker
‘‘is a demeaning, bigoted term [. . . ] a sharp racial insult that res-
onates with white southerners [. . . ] offensive and evidence of ill
intent’’, Verna et al. (2007) explain that the slur kike is ‘‘a term
of abuse for Jews’’ whereas the slur chink is ‘‘a term of abuse for
Asians’’ (p. 468), and Blackwell (2004) explains that the slur ‘‘‘‘slut ’’,
a charge easy to level and hard to disprove, is an ambivalent em-
blem ofwomen’s perception of their sexuality’’ (p. 141,my empha-
sis). As Anderson and Lepore (2013a)write, there are awide variety
of slurs ‘‘that target groups on the basis of race (‘nigger’), nation-
ality (‘kraut’), religion (‘kike’), gender (‘bitch’), sexual orientation
(‘fag’), immigrant status (‘wetback’) and sundry other demograph-
ics’’ (p. 25). So one basic fact about slurs is that an application of
a particular slur in context occurs based on considerations of its
systematic differential application-conditions, which concern de-
scriptive attributes of targets such as their racial or sexual identity.
Another basic fact about slurs is that they are often considered
to be among the most offensive of all linguistic expressions. The
racial slur nigger, for instance, is commonly identified as ‘‘one of the
most racially offensivewords in the language’’ (Oxford English Dic-
tionary, 2014) and Christopher Darden has popularly characterized
the slur as the ‘‘filthiest, dirtiest, nastiest word in the English lan-
guage’’ (Kennedy, 2002, p. 23; Knowles, 2009). Fitten (1993) even
proposes that slurs should be considered ‘‘fighting words’’ since
they have often been used to initiate violence and carry out hate
crimes, and Jeshion (2013a) further suggests that ‘‘Slurring terms
are used as weapons in those contexts in which they are used to
derogate an individual or group of individuals to whom the slur is
applied or the socially relevant group that the slur references’’ (p.
237, my emphasis). In discussions concerning the history and use
of various slurs, Cole (2013) has also discussed how slurs have been
used to initiate fights in hockey, McIntyre (2013) has discussed
how slurs have been used to initiate fights in football, and Hoover
(2007) has discussed how slurs have been used to initiate fights on
2 For proposed adequacy conditions for accounts of slurs see for instance Hom,
2008, p. 426; Croom, 2011, p. 355; Croom, 2013a, p. 200.college campuses. In yet other discussions concerning the history
and use of various slurs, Islam (2011) discusses how a 7-year old
boy killed one of his classmates for targeting himwith a homopho-
bic slur, Reifowitz (2013) discusses how the slur nigger was the last
word thousands of African Americas heard before they were sav-
agely lynched by white supremacists, and Kemp (2014) discusses
how 4 perpetrators in Philadelphia were recently charged for kid-
napping, assaulting, and forcibly tattooing racial slurs on the arms
of their victim. Resultantly, prohibitions against slurs are often so
strong now that Craver (1994) even reports a case where one man
was fired from his job for merely listening to a radio station show
that had used slurs in conversation. So another basic fact about
slurs is that they are among the most potentially offensive expres-
sions that natural language has to offer.
3. The traditional assumption that slurs and descriptors are
coreferential expressions
Having now briefly reviewed some basic facts about slurs in
the previous section, this section will proceed to critically assess
the widespread assumption that slurs (e.g. faggot) and descriptors
(e.g.male homosexual) are coreferential expressions with precisely
the same extension (Dummett, 1973, p. 454;Hornsby, 2001, p. 129;
Williamson, 2003, p. 261; Whiting, 2007, p. 192; Whiting,
2008, p. 385; McCready, 2010, p. 5, 9; Anderson and Lepore,
2013a, p. 26–27; Anderson and Lepore, 2013b, p. 351; Vallee,
2014, p. 79). In an early and influential discussion involving the slur
boche, for instance, Dummett (1973) proposed that ‘‘The condition
for applying the term to someone is that he is of German nationality;
the consequences of its application are that he is barbarous and
more prone to cruelty than other Europeans’’, and that ‘‘We should
envisage the connections in both directions as sufficiently tight
as to be involved in the very meaning of the word: neither could
be severed without altering its meaning’’ (p. 454, my emphasis).
Williamson (2003) similarly argued that the slur ‘‘‘Boche’ has
the same reference as ‘German’’’ (p. 261) and that therefore ‘‘the
differences between ‘Boche’ and ‘German’ apparently play no role
in determining reference, and so make no difference to the way in
which the terms contribute to the truth-conditions of sentences in
which they occur’’ (p. 261, my emphasis; see also Williamson,
2009, 2010). Whiting (2008) also argues that ‘‘the meaning of [the
slur] ‘Boche’ is given by whatever inferential rules govern (and
thereby determine themeaning of) ‘German’’’ (p. 385)while Vallee
(2014) further claims that ‘‘the extension of ‘‘German’’ is the set of
German people, as is the extension of ‘‘boche’’, and the extension
of ‘‘Chinese’’ is the set of Chinese people, as is the extension of
‘‘chink’’ (p. 79). Luvell Anderson and Ernie Lepore have accordingly
considered the expressions boche and German, and the expressions
chink and Chinese, as examples of ‘‘slurs and their neutral counter-
parts’’ (2013a, p. 26–27, my emphasis) which they consider to be
‘‘co-referential expressions for the same group’’ (2013b, p. 351, my
emphasis).3 Other examples of ‘‘co-referential expressions for the
same group’’ have also been suggested by Whiting (2007) and
include ‘‘the pairs ‘faggot’ and ‘male homosexual’, ‘nigger’ and
‘black’ and ‘Kike’ and ‘Jew’’’ (p. 192). McCready (2010) similarly
suggests that ‘‘Kraut is a pejorative term for German people on its
nominal use’’ and that ‘‘the expressed content of Kraut is roughly
that German people are bad’’ (p. 5, 9).
Given that two expressionsα1 andα2 are commonly considered
coreferring expressions just in case referent(α1) = referent(α2)
for the expressions α1 and α2 (van Deemter and Kibble, 2000, p.
3 Safir (2005) suggests in ‘‘Abandoning Coreference’’ that the ‘‘intended
coreference involves picking out the same referent, the same extension in theworld
of discourse’’ (p. 629).
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on slurs has been that the referent(boche) = referent(German) for
the expressions boche and German, that the referent(chink) = ref-
erent(Chinese) for the expressions chink and Chinese, that the refer-
ent(faggot)= referent(male homosexual) for the expressions faggot
andmale homosexual, that the referent(kike)= referent(Jewish) for
the expressions kike and Jewish, that the referent(kraut) = refer-
ent(German) for the expressions kraut and German, and that the
referent(nigger) = referent(African American) for the expressions
nigger and African American (see for instance Dummett, 1973, p.
454; Hornsby, 2001, p. 129; Williamson, 2003, p. 261; Whiting,
2007, p. 192;Whiting, 2008, p. 385;McCready, 2010, p. 5, 9; Ander-
son and Lepore, 2013a, p. 26–27; Anderson and Lepore, 2013b, p.
351; Vallee, 2014, p. 79). As Hom (2008) popularly proposed in
‘‘The Semantics of Racial Epithets’’, ‘‘For any racial epithet [or slur],
[we can] call its nonpejorative correlate (NPC) the expression that
picks out the supposed extension of the epithet but without ex-
pressing derogation towardsmembers of that extension. For exam-
ple, the NPC of ‘chink’ is ‘Chinese’, the NPC of ‘kike’ is ‘Jewish’, the
NPC of ‘nigger’ is ‘African-American’, and so on’’ (p. 417, fn. 4; see
also Hornsby, 2001, p. 129). Hom (2010) further proposed in ‘‘Pejo-
ratives’’ that ‘‘for any derogatoryword, D, and its neutral counterpart,
N [. . . ] to call someone a D is to say that they ought to be subject to
discriminatory practices for having negative, stereotypical proper-
ties because of being anN ’’ (2010, p. 174, 180,my emphasis). Finally,
Whiting (2013) writes that ‘‘slurs express the same semantic content
when used as their neutral counterparts; that is, slurs and their neu-
tral counterparts contribute the same thing to what is said by uses of
sentences involving them’’ (p. 364, my emphasis). Clearly a perusal
of the extant literature on slurs shows that the assumption that
slurs and descriptors are coreferential expressions with precisely
the same extension is widespread. The purpose of this section was
to make this point clear. In the next section my purpose is there-
fore to turn to consider four sources of evidence demonstrating the
falsity of this widely held assumption.
4. Reconsidering the case that slurs and descriptors are
coreferential expressions
Here I challenge prior scholarship on slurs by arguing for the
claim that slurs and descriptors are not coreferential expressions
with precisely the same extension, and accordingly, that the lat-
ter are not simply nonpejorative correlates (NPCs) of the former.
The relationship between slurs and descriptors is more complex
than that and I will clarify this relationship by introducing the no-
tion of a conceptual anchor in section five. But first let us consider in
this section four sources of supporting evidence showing that slurs
and descriptors are in fact not coreferential expressions with pre-
cisely the same extension. The first source of supporting evidence
suggesting that slurs and descriptors are not coreferential expres-
sionswith precisely the same extension comes from the discussion
Szekely (2008) provides in ‘‘OffensiveWords’’. Here Szekely (2008)
discusses how slurs were used in his linguistic community and re-
ports that the slur faggot was in fact used to apply to some but not all
male homosexuals. As Szekely (2008) reports in ‘‘OffensiveWords’’:
faggot didn’t mean gay when I was a kid, you called someone a
faggot for being a faggot, you know? [. . . ] ‘‘you’re not supposed to
use those for that ’’ [said in an annoying voice as if from another
person, then Szekely replies normally] ‘‘shut up faggot!’’ [. . . ]
I would never call a gay guy a faggot, unless he was being a
faggot. But not because he’s gay, you understand. (quoted also
in Croom, 2011, p. 352)
4 In other words, given that α1 and α2 are noun phrases (NPs) with unique
referents in the contexts in which they occur, α1 and α2 are considered to corefer
if and only if referent(α1) = referent(α2) (van Deemter and Kibble, 2000, p. 629;
Reimer, 2009).It is evident from this discussion that Szekely (2008) provides
that the slur faggot is primarily used by speakers to apply (if at
all) to some male homosexuals – namely, just those with attributes
that the speaker does not consider acceptable or equal but rather as
unacceptable or unequal – but not necessarily to them all. This is the
point that Szekely (2008) makes in claiming that ‘‘I would never
call a gay guy a faggot, unless hewas being a faggot. But not because
he’s gay, you understand’’. Further, the fact that the slur faggot is
differentially used so that it is often applied to some but not allmale
homosexuals suggests that the slur faggot and the descriptormale
homosexual are in fact not coreferential expressions with precisely
the same extension at all. In other words this discussion by Szekely
(2008) suggests that it is not the case that the referent(faggot)
= referent(male homosexual) for the expressions faggot and male
homosexual, as it is widely assumed in the literature.
The second source of supporting evidence suggesting that slurs
and descriptors are not coreferential expressions with precisely
the same extension comes from the discussion MacDonald (1999)
provides in All Souls: A Family Story from Southie. Here MacDonald
(1999) discusses how slurs were used in his linguistic community
and reports that the slur nigger was in fact used to apply to some
but not all African Americans (p. 61). As MacDonald (1999) explains
in All Souls:
I spent hours in our apartment in Old Colony trying to grasp
this hierarchy of niggers that I’d discovered. I wanted to know
exactly where I fit into the scheme. Of course, no one considered
himself a nigger. It was always something you called someone who
could be considered anything less than you. I soon found out that
therewere a fewblack families living inOld Colony. They’d lived
there for years and everyone said that they were okay, that they
weren’t niggers but just black. It felt good to all of us to not be as
bad as the hopeless people in D Street or, God forbid, the ones in
Columbia point, whowere both black and niggers. But now I was
jealous of the kids in Old Harbour Project down the road, which
seemed like a step up from Old Colony, having many families
left over from when housing projects were for war veterans,
and when some of the kids had fathers. Of course, we were all
niggers ifwewent to City Point, so forget going there again to see
the beautiful beaches and Castle Island. I wondered if the Point
kids might be niggers to people who’d really made it, like out in
tidy West Roxbury or the suburbs that everyone talked about
moving to when they won the lottery. (p. 61, my emphasis)
The ‘‘few black families living in Old Colony [. . . ]weren’t niggers
but just black’’, MacDonald (1999) explains, because ‘‘They’d live
there for years and everyone said they were okay’’, whereas in con-
trast with the comparatively neutral descriptive expression black,
the more affectively forceful slur expression nigger was understood
to be especially reserved as ‘‘always something you called someone
who could be considered anything less than you’’ (p. 61, my empha-
sis; for discussion on the use of slurs for social distancing see also
Croom, 2011; Croom, 2013a; Camp, 2013). So similarly to the case
of sex-oriented slurs like faggot that Szekely (2008) discussed in
‘‘OffensiveWords’’, it is evident in this case that race-oriented slurs
like nigger are also used (if at all) to apply to some African Amer-
icans – namely, just those with attributes that the speaker does not
consider acceptable or equal but rather as unacceptable or unequal
– but not necessarily to them all. This is the point that MacDonald
(1999) makes when he says about some of the African American
families living in Old Colony – that ‘‘they weren’t niggers but just
black’’ (p. 61, my emphasis). Further, the fact that the slur nigger
is differentially used so that it is often applied to some but not all
African Americans suggests that the slur nigger and the descriptor
African American are in fact not coreferential expressions with pre-
cisely the same extension at all. In other words this discussion by
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ent(nigger)= referent(African American) for the expressions nigger
and African American, as it is widely assumed in the literature.
The third source of supporting evidence suggesting that slurs
anddescriptors are not coreferential expressionswith precisely the
sameextension comes from thediscussion Troyani (2013) provides
in ‘‘Guido Culture: TheDestabilization of Italian-American Identity
on Jersey Shore’’. Here Troyani (2013) offers an informative
discussion of the differential application-conditions for the slur
guido and the descriptor Italian-American, which highlights the
important fact that the application-conditions for typical targets
of the slur guido involve attributes that saliently differ from the
attributes involved in the application-conditions for typical targets
of the descriptor Italian-American. So given the fact that there are
saliently different application-conditions for the slur guido and the
descriptor Italian-American, it is clear that the slur guido has in
fact been used to apply to some but not all Italian-Americans. As
Troyani (2013) explains in ‘‘Guido Culture’’:
Some Italian Americans may aspire to live as Guidos or
Guidettes. However,Guidos andGuidettes are not necessarily Ital-
ian American. The dubious Italian heritage of cast members sug-
gests that if non-Italian Americans can adopt seemingly Italian-
American Guido and Guidette characteristics and behaviours,
these characteristics may also be achieved rather than inherited
by Italian Americans. (p. 4, my emphasis)
It is evident from this discussion that Troyani (2013) provides
that the slur guido is primarily used by speakers to apply (if at
all) to some Italian Americans – namely, just those considered to
exhibit the saliently prototypical characteristics and behaviours of
‘‘guido culture’’– but not necessarily to them all. This is the point
that Troyani (2013) makes when she claims that ‘‘Some Italian
Americansmay aspire to live as Guidos or Guidettes.However,Guidos
and Guidettes are not necessarily Italian American’’ (p. 4). Further,
the fact that the slur guido is differentially used so that it applies
to some but not all Italian–Americans suggests that the slur guido
and the descriptor Italian-American are in fact not coreferential
expressions with precisely the same extension at all. That is to
say, this discussion by Troyani (2013) suggests that it is not the
case that the referent(guido) = referent(Italian-American) for the
expressions guido and Italian-American, as it is widely assumed in
the literature.
The fourth and final source of supporting evidence suggesting
that slurs and descriptors are not coreferential expressions with
precisely the same extension comes from the discussion Chris
Rock (1996, 1997, 2002) provides in ‘‘Niggas vs. Black People’’,
perhaps one of the most popular and controversial performances
in the history of standup comedy (Hartsell, 2012; Hoggard, 2006;
Farley, 2004; Schruers, 1997; Jeshion, 2013b, p. 309, 314–315).
Here Rock (1996, 1997, 2002) offers an informative discussion
of the differential application-conditions for the slur nigger and
the descriptor black, which highlights the important fact that the
application-conditions for typical targets of the slur nigger involve
attributes that saliently differ from the attributes involved in the
application-conditions for typical targets of the descriptor black
(see for instance track 12 on Rock, 1997; track 8 on Rock, 2002).5 So
given the fact that there are saliently different application-conditions
for the slur nigger and the descriptor black, it is clear that the slur
nigger has in fact been used to apply to some but not all African
Americans (Farley, 2004; Hoggard, 2006). As Rock (1996) illustrates
the point in ‘‘Niggas vs. Black People’’:
5 For further discussion of the differential application-conditions for slurs see
Croom, 2014a, p. 227–228, 233–235.There’s like a civil war going on with black people, and there’s
two sides: there’s black people, and there’s niggas. The niggas
have got to go. Every time black people want to have a good
time, ignorant ass niggas fuck it up [. . . ] Can’t go to a movie
the first week it comes out. Why? Cause niggas are shooting
at the screen! What kind of ignorant shit is that? [. . . ] Hey I
love black people, but I hate niggas boy, boy I hate niggas [. . . ]
Can’t have shit in your house! Why? Because niggas will break
in your house. Niggas that live next door to you break in your
house, come over the next day and go, ‘‘I heard you got robbed’’.
Nigga, you know you robbed me! You ain’t hear shit cause you
was doing shit! Damn. Tired of niggas [. . . ] You know what’s
the worst thing about niggas? Niggas always want some credit
for some shit they supposed to do. For some shit they’re just
supposed to do. A nigga will brag about some shit a normal man
just does. A nigga will say some shit like, ‘‘I take care of my
kids’’. You’re supposed to you dumb motherfucker! What kind
of ignorant shit is that? ‘‘I ain’t never been to jail!’’ What do
you want, a cookie?! You’re not supposed to go to jail, you low-
expectation-having motherfucker! Fuck man, I’m tired of this
shit. You know what’s the worst thing about niggas, the worst
thing about niggas? Niggas love to not know. Nothing makes a
nigga happier than not knowing the answer to your question.
Just ask a nigga a question, any nigga, ‘‘hey nigga what’s the
capital of Zaire?’’ ‘‘I don’t know that shit! Keepin’ it real!’’Niggas
love to keep it real; real dumb!Niggas hate knowledge. Shit, Iwas
talking about niggas breaking in your house, well if you want to
save your money put it in your books. Cause niggas don’t read.
Put the money in the books, shit, books are like kryptonite to a
nigga [. . . ] Every time you see welfare in the news they always
show black people. Black people don’t give a fuck about welfare.
Niggas are shaking in their boots! ‘‘Oh they’re goin’ to take our
shit!’’ Shit, a black man that’s got two jobs, going to work every
day, hates a nigga on welfare. Nigga get a job! I got two, you can’t
get one? (my emphasis, see also Rock, 1997, track 12 Rock, 2002,
track 8)
In their commentary on this highly controversial yet influential
performance, Farley (2004) pointed out how ‘‘Rock contrasted
the values of middle class blacks with lower-income blacks who
had succumbed to a kind of gangsta despair’’ (my emphasis)
while Hoggard (2006) also pointed out how ‘‘Rock claimed it
was socially acceptable for black people to refer to segments of
the black population that degraded the black community through
laziness and stupidity as ‘‘Niggas’’ [rather than ‘‘Black People’’]’’
(my emphasis; see also Jeshion, 2013b, p. 309, 314–315). So
similarly to the case that Szekely (2008) considered concerning
the slur faggot, that MacDonald (1999) considered concerning the
slur nigger, and that Troyani (2013) considered concerning the
slur guido, it is also evident from this discussion that Rock (1996)
provides in ‘‘Niggas vs. Black People’’ that the slur nigger is again
primarily used (if at all) to apply to some African Americans –
namely, just those with attributes that the speaker does not consider
acceptable or equal but rather as unacceptable or unequal – but
not necessarily to them all. In other words this discussion by Rock
(1996) suggests that it is not the case that the referent(nigger) =
referent(African American) for the expressions nigger and African
American, as it is widely assumed in the literature.
We have now considered four sources of supporting evidence
demonstrating the falsity of the widely held assumption in the
theoretical literature that slurs and descriptors are coreferential
expressionswith precisely the sameextension. By carefully consid-
ering empirical data on slur use, I have argued here that slurs and
descriptors differ in their application conditions and thereby differ
in their extensions. Further, because slurs and descriptors differ in
their extensions they also differ in their meaning or content. The
purpose of this section was to make this point clear. In the next
34 A.M. Croom / Ampersand 2 (2015) 30–38section my purpose is therefore to turn to reconsider the relation-
ship between slurs and descriptors and introduce the notion of a
conceptual anchor to help provide a clearer understanding of their
semantic or conceptual content.
5. Reconsidering the relationship between slurs and descrip-
tors
In the literature on concepts or categories, a distinction is com-
monly drawn between classical accounts and family resemblance
accounts (Rosch andMervis, 1975). According to classical accounts,
‘‘categories are defined by formal rules and allow us to make infer-
ences within idealized law governed systems’’ (Pinker and Prince,
1996, p. 332, my emphasis). So the classical account of categories
maintains that category membership is determined by the posses-
sion of some common, essential, and criterial attribute. However, a
substantive challenge formaintaining a classical account for all cat-
egories of natural language is that scholars remain unable to artic-
ulate necessary and sufficient conditions for most that are actually
found from natural language (Fodor et al., 1980; Pinker and Prince,
1996; Rosch and Mervis, 1975). It is further clear from the extant
literature on expressive expressions that this point applies a fortiori
to slurs and general pejoratives (see for instance Potts et al., 2009).
Alternatively, and in contrast with the classical account, the
family resemblance account of categories maintains that category
membership consists of a relationship in which case ‘‘each item
has at least one, and probably several, elements in common with
one or more other items, but no, or few, elements are common to
all items’’ (Rosch and Mervis, 1975, p. 575; Wittgenstein, 1953).
Pinker and Prince (1996) usefully distinguish family resemblance
from classical categories by pointing out several salient ways in
which they differ. First, family resemblance categories differ from
classical categories in that the former lack necessary and sufficient
conditions for categorymembershipwhereas the latter do not. Sec-
ond, family resemblance categories differ from classical categories
in that the former have graded degrees of category membership
whereas the latter do not. Third, family resemblance categories dif-
fer from classical categories in that the former can be summarized
by an ideal category member or prototype whereas the latter can-
not. Fourth, family resemblance categories differ from classical cat-
egories in that the former have categorymembers that tend to have
characteristic non-defining attributes whereas the latter do not.
Importantly, the family resemblance account avoids the challenge
faced by the classical account in that the former does not maintain
as the latter does that concepts or categories are strictly definable
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, the fam-
ily resemblance account maintains that most concepts of natural
language are characterizable in terms of their family resemblance
relationship. Indeed, Pinker and Prince (1996) explain that family
resemblance concepts are characterizable in terms of ‘‘correlations
among features in sets of similar memorized exemplars, and allow
us to make inferences about the observable products of history’’
(p. 353) and Rosch and Mervis (1975) similarly explain that family
resemblance ‘‘prototypes appear to be just those members of the
category thatmost reflect the redundancy structure of the category
as a whole. That is, categories form to maximize the information
rich clusters of attributes in the environment’’ (p. 602; Rosch et al.,
1976). The family resemblance account of concepts or categories
is therefore more realistic than the classical account insofar as it
provides an account of concepts that is actually in accord with the
real rather than ideal nature of human psychology.
For example, what makes x amember of the categoryMUSIC on
the family-resemblance conception is not some essentially criterial
attribute that each and every xmust have in order to be categorized
as music. For a paradigmatic or prototypical musical work may
typically or for themost part have a chorus and acoustic instruments,but could still be felicitously and informatively categorized as
music even if it did not have a chorus or acoustic instruments,
provided that the category MUSIC is that which is still most
strategically apt amongother options (for example, RECIPE, KOALA,
and so on) available to that speaker for their current cognitive
or communicative purpose. So with regard to slurs, my proposal
here follows Croom (2011, 2013a, 2014b) in adopting a family
resemblance conception of category membership to account for
the fact that the felicitous application of the slur faggot need not be
restricted to male homosexuals (Szekely, 2008), that the felicitous
application of the slur guido need not be restricted to Italian
Americans (Troyani, 2013), and that the felicitous application of the
slur nigger need not be restricted to African Americans (MacDonald,
1999; Rock, 1996), ormore generally, that the felicitous application
of a slur S need not necessarily target someone instantiating an
associated neutral descriptive attribute G (Croom, 2014c, fn. 20;
Croom, 2011, p. 352–357; Croom, 2013a,b). More specifically, the
alternative approach proposed by Croom (2011, 2013a, 2014b)
suggests that the expression nigger (identified as N below) can be
usefully understood as a family resemblance (rather than classical)
category consisting in a constellation of prototypical attributes
(identified as a1–a10 below) such as the following:
N (Nigger)
a1 x is African American.6
a2 x is lazy.7
a3 x is subservient.8
a4 x is commonly the recipient of poor treatment.9
a5 x is athletic or musical.10
a6 x is sexually liberal or licentious.11
a7 x is simple-minded.12
a8 x is emotionally shallow.13
a9 x is a survivor, tough, or aggressive.14
a10 x is loud or excessively noisy.15
Note that I am not suggesting here that attributes a1–a10 should
be understood as fixed in the precise rank-order provided in the ex-
ample above, or that all of a1–a10 are always involved in a context-
independentmanner. Indeed that suggestionwould bemore in ac-
cordwith the classical approach to concepts or categories and con-
trary to the very family resemblance approach I advocate here. And
as I briefly discussed earlier, the classical approach has been in-
creasingly undermined by a growing body of recent empirical lit-
erature on the nature of humanmemory, concepts, and sensorimo-
tor cognition (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou et al., 2003; Borghi, 2004;
Barsalou et al., 2007; Barsalou, 2008, 2009; Borghi and Riggio,
2009; Borghi et al., 2013; Dove, 2010, 2014). The alternative then
that I propose here is that attributes a1–a10 should be considered as
rank-ordered based on the relative degree in which their attribu-
tion to x is taken as a salient indicator of categorymembership, and
importantly, that this rank-order is re-organizable in a context-
dependent manner. Further, in practice more attributes (for exam-
ple, a1–a15) or less attributes (for example, a1–a2, or even a1 alone)
could be involved in a given cognitive or communicative context.
6 Fredrickson, 1971, p. 41 and Asim, 2007, p. 12.
7 Asim, 2007, p. 27.
8 Fredrickson, 1971, p. 41 and Asim, 2007, p. 12.
9 Fredrickson, 1971, p. 41 and Asim, 2007, p. 12.
10 Alim et al., 2010, p. 128.
11 Asim, 2007, p. 27.
12 Asim, 2007, p. 27.
13 Asim, 2007, p. 27.
14 Anderson, 1999, p. 50 and Rahman, 2012.
15 Anderson, 1999, p. 50.
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informative (for listing a1 alone would fall short of this) and eco-
nomical (for listing a1–a20 would go beyond this) in our discussion.
My suggestion here is that a1 (African American) would be
ranked relatively higher than a6 (sexually liberal or licentious) and
accordingly a1 would be considered a more salient indicator than
a6 that the x possessing it is a member of N (nigger). Note also that
although speakers may typically apply the slur nigger to targets at-
tributed the highest-ranking (a1) as well as the greatest quantity
(a1–a10) of attributes in N , my family resemblance account main-
tains (contrary to classical accounts) that speakers may still infor-
matively or effectively apply that slur to x even if that x fails to pos-
sess the highest-ranking (a1) or even the most (a1–a10) attributes
in N insofar as that is the most relevant and apt lexical choice for
their purpose in a particular cognitive or communicative context
(for further discussion of relevance in communication and cogni-
tion see also Sperber andWilson, 1986;Wilson and Sperber, 2004).
Importantly, however, in order for the choice of a speaker to re-
fer to x as a nigger to be considered a strategically apt choice for
that speaker, it must be assumed (at least for the purpose of that
particular situation) that x possesses a practically sufficient set of
attributes such that N is the most appropriate or serviceable cate-
gory for the speaker to subsume x for their purpose in a particular
cognitive or communicative context. So for example, in the case
that a speaker intends to communicate that some x that they dis-
like, consider inferior, or would like to be distanced from possesses
some subset of a1–a10 under N , that speaker may make the strate-
gic choice to useN in communication as thatwhichmost efficiently
and economically predicates the intended attributes of x as well as
most forcefully expresses a negative attitude towards x, or most
successfully establishes a distancing relation with x, at least to the
extent that N is better for this than other categories that are af-
forded to that language-user.
In order to account for cases of linguistic appropriation (for
further discussion of slurs and appropriation see also in Rahman,
2012; Bianchi, 2014; Croom, 2013a, 2014b, 2015b), I further sug-
gest that if, for instance, an in-group African American speaker X
is intending to communicate that they are sufficiently similar to
some hearer Y insofar as X and Y are both attributed a1, a4, and
possibly other attributes (such as a5 and a6, or a9), and if X and Y
knoweachotherwell-enoughor have established enough common
ground to understand that X does not dislike or consider them-
selves superior to Y and does not intend to communicate that Y
possesses most of the other (typically negative) attributes belong-
ing to N , then X as an in-group speaker might strategically choose
to employN as the category thatmost efficiently and economically
predicates the intended (shared) attributes of Y , such as a1 (African
American), a4 (commonly the recipient of poor treatment), and pos-
sibly other (positive) attributes – such as a5 (athletic or musical), a6
(sexually liberal or licentious), or a9 (a survivor, tough, or aggressive)
– at least to the extent that N is better for this than other cate-
gories that are afforded to that language-user (Croom, 2010a,b). In
contrast with other classical accounts of slurs that incorrectly as-
sume that the possession of some criterial attribute is essential for
x to be considered a member of N (see, for instance Camp, 2013, p.
338, 342 fn. 16), the alternative account of slurs proposed by Croom
(2011, 2013a, 2014b) and expanded upon here maintains (in ac-
cord with the family resemblance account) that, for example, al-
though different individuals that are referred to by the slur nigger
are very likely to share different subsets of attributes (for exam-
ple, a1–a10) with other individuals also referred to by this slur (due
to common knowledge of how this expression is typically used) it
need not necessarily be the case (for the sake of the felicitous appli-
cation of that slur) that each and every slurred xmust share some
criterial attribute with every other slurred x (for further discus-
sion of interesting cases see also Sweetland, 2002, p. 514; Croom,2011, p. 356; Croom, 2013a, p. 199). Rather, what is of importance
on this alternative family resemblance account is that the use of a
slur by a speaker may be considered a strategically apt enough or
optimally relevant lexical choice for their purposes in a particular
cognitive or communicative context.
Further, instead of considering some descriptive attribute (a1
or African American) as necessary or criterial for the felicitous appli-
cation of a slur S (nigger), the alternative account I propose here
is that the descriptive attribute (a1 or African American) instead
serves as a conceptual anchor for S, which may be understood as
the most relevantly salient (rather than necessary) default descriptor
(e.g. a1 or African American) that helps communicative agents ground
the apt application of S (e.g. nigger) towards its prototypical (rather
than essentially categorical) targets (Croom, 2014c, fn. 20). In other
words, whereas classical accounts of slurs maintain that the de-
scriptor African American is a nonpejorative correlate (NPC) of the
slur nigger and that African American and nigger are coreferential
expressionswith precisely the same extension, here I instead argue
that the descriptor African American is at most only the conceptual
anchor for the slur nigger since African American and nigger are not
coreferential expressions with precisely the same extension. As I
have shown above, the application-conditions for typical targets
of the slur nigger involve attributes that saliently differ from the at-
tributes involved in the application-conditions for typical targets of
the descriptor black (Rock, 1996, 1997, 2002) so there is good rea-
son to maintain that these expressions differ in their semantic or
conceptual content. Nonetheless, my account still makes sense of
the common association between slurs and descriptors by suggest-
ing that descriptors still serve as salient anchors for the semantic
or conceptual content of slurs. That is to say, although my account
denies the classical view that the descriptor African American is an
essential attribute for all felicitous targets of the slur nigger to pos-
sess, it nonetheless maintains that the descriptor African American
is still practically useful in grounding a conventional understand-
ing of what is most salient of typical targets of the slur nigger.
I further propose that for formal or strict concepts, such as those
involved in mathematics or the sciences, the conceptual anchor is
made to play not merely a guiding or grounding role, as in the case
of most family resemblance concepts of natural language, but a
strictly determinative or criterial role. The claim here is that it is the
especially strict formality with which the concept is made to apply
that ensures the strict formality of its semantic or conceptual con-
tent. So for instance, concepts of chemistry that are primarily used
among and so normatively regulated by a community of chemists
will thereby have semantic or conceptual content that is more for-
mal or strict than other concepts from natural language that are
not so normatively regulated (for further discussion of concepts
and normativity see also Croom, 2012, 2010a). In other words, the
content of H2O is more strictly formal than the content of water
because the application of H2O is more strictly regulated by a nar-
rower andmore specialized community than the application ofwa-
ter is.
One benefit of the account that I propose here is that it is flexi-
ble enough to accommodate informal or looser concepts likewater,
the application ofwhich is less strictly regulated by awider and less
specialized community, by allowing the actual variety of their con-
ditions for felicitous application to contribute to the specification
of prototypical attributes (whichmaybe listed in the forma1−an) to
be subsumed under the conceptwater. Yet my account also readily
accommodates formal or strict concepts like H2O, the application
of which is more strictly regulated by a narrower and more spe-
cialized community, by allowing the actual restrictiveness of their
conditions for felicitous application to contribute to the specifica-
tion of essential or criterial attributes (which may be listed in the
form a1 alone) to be subsumed under the concept of H2O.
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flexible yet robust enough to further account for semantic evolu-
tion and linguistic appropriation (for further discussion of seman-
tic evolution see also Croom, 2008, 2013b). Since my account al-
lows the actual variety of application conditions for a concept or
expression S to contribute to the prototypical attributes (a1–a10)
understood to be subsumed under S, my account thereby allows
a change or evolution in the actual application of S to result in a
corresponding change or evolution to the meaning or content of S.
A consistent and salient change in the use of S can thereby change
the meaning or content of S by (i) introducing or removing proto-
typical attributes (a1–a10) from S, or (ii) reorganizing the internal
structure, rank-order, or affect felt towards the attributes (a1–a10)
in S. Consequently, counter-culture communities often constitute
an effective force by influencing the change of the actual applica-
tion of expressions or concepts and thereby our understanding of
what those expressions or concepts mean. Being able to account
for the formality as well as flexibility of concepts or expressions,
along with the possibility for their evolution and appropriation, is
a major advantage of my view that remains missing from others.
The purpose of this section was to reconsider the relationship
between slurs and descriptors and introduce the notion of a con-
ceptual anchor to help provide a clearer understanding of their se-
mantic or conceptual content. Having accomplished this, the pur-
pose of the next and final section is to conclude by considering the
inadequacy of common dictionary definitions of slurs.
6. Considering the inadequacy of dictionary definitions of slurs
It should be granted that some scholars have previously at-
tempted to offer a plausible case in support of the view that
slurs and descriptors are coreferential expressions with precisely
the same extension. Yet such attempts have been almost en-
tirely based on standard dictionary definitions of slurs (see for in-
stance Williamson, 2003, p. 261). In ‘‘Understanding and Infer-
ence’’, for example, Williamson (2003) draws upon the Concise Ox-
ford Dictionary to argue that the slur boche is defined as a corefer-
ential expression (that expresses contempt) for Germans (p. 261).
Williamson (2003) for instance argues that the slur expression
‘‘‘Boche’ has the same reference as [the neutrally descriptive expres-
sion] ‘German’. That is certainly the dictionary viewof thematter. Un-
der ‘Boche’, the Concise Oxford Dictionary gives the definition ‘(Con-
tempt[uous] for) German’’’ (p. 261, my emphasis).
Despite such an appeal to dictionary definitions, Kenneth
Himma (2002) has convincingly argued in ‘‘On theDefinition ofUn-
conscionable Racial and Sexual Slurs’’ that dictionaries that simply
‘‘define the word ‘‘nigger’’ as ‘‘black person’’’’ and ‘‘the word ‘‘fag-
got’’ as ‘‘male homosexual’’’’ inappropriately imply that certain of-
fensive claims – such as the racist claim that all black people are
niggers and the sexist claim that all male homosexuals are faggots –
are not just true (which is dubious enough) but are (even worse)
necessarily true (p. 512; see also Hom, 2008, p. 421–422; Croom,
2011, p. 352). For ‘‘Just as the definition of ‘‘bachelor’’ as ‘‘unmar-
riedmale’’ implies that it is conceptually impossible for there to be an
unmarried male who isn’t also a bachelor, Merriam-Webster’s defi-
nition of ‘‘nigger’’ as ‘‘black person’’ implies that it is conceptually
impossible for there to be a black person who isn’t also a nigger ’’,
Himma (2002) argues, and ‘‘Likewise, Merriam-Webster’s defini-
tion of ‘‘faggot’’ as ‘‘male homosexual’’ implies that it is conceptually
impossible for there to be a male homosexual who isn’t also a faggot ’’
(p. 512, my emphasis). ‘‘Since these reprehensible claims consti-
tute the very foundation for racist and heterosexist views’’, Himma
(2002) concludes, dictionaries such as ‘‘Merriam-Webstermust re-
vise its definitions of these terms to avoid committing itself to such
views’’ (p. 512, my emphasis). Given considerations of this kind,
the argument from definition that Williamson (2003) has offeredin support of the claim that slurs and descriptors are coreferential
expressionswith precisely the same extension is unappealing inso-
far as it presumably rests on ‘‘definitions [that] implicitly endorse
racist and heterosexist claims’’ (Himma, 2002, p. 512, my emphasis).
The argument from definition is also unappealing onmorematter-
of-fact grounds, since it is incorrect in implying, for instance, ‘‘that
it is conceptually impossible for there to be a black person who isn’t
also a nigger’’ and ‘‘that it is conceptually impossible for there to be
a male homosexual who isn’t also a faggot’’ (Himma, 2002, p. 512,
my emphasis; Croom, 2011, p. 352). For we have now thoroughly
reviewed how an empirical consideration of the slur faggot in ‘‘Of-
fensiveWords’’ by Szekely (2008) showed that this slur was in fact
felicitously applied to some but not all male homosexuals, how an
empirical consideration of the slur nigger in All Souls by MacDon-
ald (1999) showed that this slur was in fact felicitously applied to
some but not allAfrican Americans, how an empirical consideration
of the slur guido in ‘‘Guido Culture’’ by Troyani (2013) showed that
this slur was in fact felicitously applied to some but not all Italian
Americans, and how an empirical consideration of the slur nigger
in ‘‘Niggas vs. Black People’’ by Rock (1996) showed that this slur
was in fact felicitously applied to some but not all African Ameri-
cans. A consideration of such empirical cases of slurs suggests that
the coreferentialist assumption is untenable.
Importantly, during Quine’s (1951) famous critique of the ana-
lytic/synthetic distinction in ‘‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’’, he im-
portantly pointed out how ‘‘Theword ‘‘definition’’ has come to have
a dangerously reassuring sound, due no doubt to its frequent occur-
rence in logical and mathematical writings’’ (p. 26, my emphasis)
and further argued for the importance of clarifying linguistic ‘‘no-
tion[s. . . ] in terms relating to [actual] linguistic behaviour’’ (p. 24;
see also Quine, 1968, p. 185; Quine, 1990, p. 37–43; Fisher, 2011, p.
57; Smith, 2014, p. 494; Hylton, 2014, p. 40).16 For as Quine (1951)
correctly pointed out, even ‘‘The lexicographer is an empirical scien-
tist, whose business is the recording of antecedent facts’’ concerning
how language is actually used during human communicative in-
teraction (p. 24, my emphasis). Quine (1951) illustrates this nicely
during his discussion of the synonymous expressions bachelor and
unmarried man in ‘‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’’:
how do we find that ‘bachelor’ is defined as ‘unmarried man’?
Who defined it thus, and when? Are we to appeal to the
nearest dictionary, and accept the lexicographer’s formulation
as law? Clearly this would be to put the cart before the horse.
The lexicographer is an empirical scientist, whose business is
the recording of antecedent facts; and if he glosses ‘bachelor’
as ‘unmarried man’ it is because of his belief that there is a
relation of synonymy between these forms, implicit in general
or preferred usage prior to his ownwork. The notion of synonymy
presupposed here has still to be clarified, presumably in terms
relating to linguistic behaviour. (Quine, 1951, p. 24,my emphasis;
Quine, 1990, p. 43).
In ‘‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’’ Quine (1951) pointed out the
important fact that dictionary definitions are always still empiri-
cally sensitive reports concerning how natural language is actually
used, and accordingly, Quine (1968) further argued in ‘‘Ontologi-
cal Relatively’’ that linguistic meaning is ‘‘to be studied in the same
16 For instance Hylton (2014) offers a nice discussion concerning how ‘‘For Quine,
the criterion of successful communication, whether or not translation is involved,
is fluent interaction, verbal and nonverbal: ‘‘Success in communication is judged
by smoothness of conversation, by frequent predictability of verbal and nonverbal
reactions, and by coherence and plausibility of native testimony’’ (Quine, 1990, 43)’’
(Hylton, 2014, p. 40, my emphasis). Fisher (2011) further explains how Quine held
that ‘‘the evidence which guides our learning of a language is the behaviour of other
language-users plus the observable circumstances surrounding that behaviour ’’ (p. 57,
my emphasis).
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social art which we all acquire on the evidence solely of other peo-
ple’s overt behaviour under publicly recognizable circumstances’’ (p.
185).17 The considerations that Quine (1951, 1968, 1990) has of-
fered here are important for our purposes because they serve as
a methodological reminder for language theorists that being em-
pirically sensitive to how natural language is actually used can only
help one to carefully constrain and guide theorizing about slursmore
specifically and natural languagemore generally. This is important
since the meanings of linguistic expressions are not rigidly fixated
on the past and impervious to semantic change, but are instead
open to semantic evolution and renegotiation as communicators
continue to make strategic use and sense of their available variety
of expressions during the communicative exchanges of their social
life.
7. Conclusion
Coreferentialism refers to the common assumption in the
literature that slurs (e.g. faggot) and descriptors (e.g. male homo-
sexual) are coreferential expressions with precisely the same ex-
tension (see for instance Dummett, 1973, p. 454; Hornsby, 2001, p.
129; Williamson, 2003, p. 261; Whiting, 2007, p. 192; Whiting,
2008, p. 385;McCready, 2010, p. 5, 9; Anderson and Lepore, 2013a,
p. 26–27; Anderson and Lepore, 2013b, p. 351; Vallee, 2014, p.
79). Yet here I argued against this widespread assumption by
first briefly introducing what slurs are and then considering four
sources of supporting evidence showing that slurs and descriptors
are in fact not coreferential expressions with precisely the same
extension. I argued that since slurs and descriptors differ in their
extension they thereby differ in their meaning or content also. This
article additionally introduced the notion of a conceptual anchor
in order to adequately account for the relationship between slurs
and descriptors actually evidenced in the empirical data, and fur-
ther considered the inadequacy of common dictionary definitions
of slurs. This article therefore contributes to the literature on slurs
by demonstrating that previous accounts operating on the assump-
tion that slurs and descriptors are coreferential expressions with
the same extension, and that they thereby have the samemeaning
or content, are inconsistent with empirical data and that an alter-
native account in accord with Croom (2011, 2013a, 2014b) better
fits the facts concerning their actual meaning and use.
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